DAY 155, 10PTS, 2.19F

[ROUTINE]
RUN: 2.3MILES, 9MPH, 15MIN;
SWIM: 1KM;
LEARN: LUENBERGER;

[WORK]
AO: DRAFT THE SEPARATING PBE, PELICAN, 3HRS;

[SCHOOL]
CALL J.Y. FOR THE HIRING (LOCATION, CONVENIENCE), TWO-BODY PROBLEM, 12:30PM-12:45PM, 15MIN;
ASK M.E. TO SETUP THE MEETING ON MONDAY, SET THE TONE OF THE GROUP, 2OMIN;

[THOUGHTS]
WORK OUT THE CALINIFA TRIP PLAN, 1HR;
GO TO UCI LIBRARY;

[HAPPY MOMENT]
DETECT THE DANGEROUS TREND EARLY ON;

2015-03-21 22.20.49

[AIRPORT, DC, MARCH, 2015]

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DAY 153, 10PTS, 2.17W

[ROUTINE]
RUN: 2.3MILES, 9MPH, 15MIN;
SWIM: 3K;
LEARN: LUENBERGER;

[WORK]
AO: WRITE, 3HRS;

[OTHERS]
TRAFFIC JAM ON 91, 10:30AM-12PM;
LUNCH WITH AO AND M.E. AT THE MIDDLE EAST RESTAURANT, 12PM-2:30PM;

[HAPPY MOMENT]
CHAT WITH C.L. ABOUT THE TRIP TO CATALINA ISLAND, NEXT WEEKEND;

2015-07-01 17.10.11

[AIRPORT, SAN DIEGO, CA]

DAY 139, 5PTS, 2.03

[ROUTINE]
JOG: 3MILES, 30MIN;
SWIM: 0;
LEARN: 0;

[WORK]
WRITE: AO, PELICAN, 3HRS;

[DISCIPLINE]
CLEAN UP THE MAILS, 20MIN;
SETUP ONLINE PAYMENT FOR THE UTILITY BILL, 10MIN;
CHANGE THE ECONOMIST SUBSCRIPTION ADDRESS, 10MIN;

[HAPPY MOMENT]
THE STORYLINE OF AO IS QUITE STRONG; SHOULD FINISH IT SOON.

2016-01-26 05.09.03

[INSIDE ST. PATRICK’S CATHEDRAL, NEW YORK CITY, SPRING, 2015]

DAY 136, 5PTS, 1.31

[ROUTINE]
JOG: 30MIN, 3MILES;
SWIM: 0 (MUST RESUME TOMORROW);
LEARN: LUENBERGER;

[OTHERS]
MAKE UP THE DELAYED BLOGS;

[WORK]
MHS: CHAT WITH JS, GET TYM DONE IN A WEEK, PUSH MHS, 3PM-4PM;
AO: AO WILL EMAIL ME A CLEANED UP VERSION BY TUESDAY, WEWORK IT, 4PM-5PM;
TQ2: CHAT WITH K, ON THE NUMERICAL PART, WRAP UP, NEED A WEEK, 7PM-8PM;

[HAPPY MOMENT]
FIGURE OUT THE ROOT CAUSE OF MY LAPSE IN WRITING.

2015-08-31 16.52.49

[UCSD GEISEL LIBRARY: FUTURISTIC OR…UGLY? SAN DIEGO, 9/2015]

WRITING: NOTES ON AO

This morning I had a discussion with A, mainly on the pooling equilibrium.

The basic model is as follows. The supplier S has two distribution channels: direct sell to the end consumers, and through a retailer R. The retailer is more efficient in retail operations with less retail cost. However, the retail channel suffers efficiency loss due to  double marginalization (DM) (we assume that the channel is managed by the wholesale price contract). In addition, the supplier’s type of retail cost c_i is his private information, high or low. The consumer demand is linear. Both parties are risk-neutral and profit maximizing.

We frame the problem as a signaling game. First, S learns his type c_i and sets wholesale price w(c_i). Second, R orders quantity q_R. Finally, S delivers q_R and sells q_S directly to the market. Hence the market clearing price is P= a - b(q_R+ q_S). The payoffs for R and S are
(P-w)q_R and Pq_S + c_i(q_S + q_R), respectively.

A will have a draft this weekend. Afterwards I need one more week to finalize it.

DSC00229HDR

[Key West, FL, Spring, 2015]

Day 120, 5pts, 1.15

[ROUTINE]
jog: 1.5 miles, 9 mph, 10 min;
learn: 0;
swim: 0;

[OTHERS]
drive to school, 9-10am;
personnel meeting, 10-12pm;
school meeting, 1pm-2:30pm;
lunch with M and B at student Hub, 12-1pm;
discussion with AO at the Pitta restaurant;

[DISCIPLINE]
sleep at 8pm;

[HAPPY MOMENT]
meet with AO;

2011-10-09 088

[Carmel, CA, 10/09/2011]