CLEAN UP THE MAILS, 27MIN;
EMAIL LISA FOR THE DOCUMENTS AND ASK TRAVEL QUESTIONS;
ZC ASKED ME TO TRAVEL TO MEXICO (NOT THIS TIME, I HAVE TOO MUCH ON THE PLATE);
FEELING DOWN, BUT I AM GRATEFUL THAT THINGS ARE STILL GOING WELL;
[MONTREAL, CANADA, 6/6/2006]
MONTREAL IS ONE OF A FEW CITIES IN NORTH AMERICA THAT ACTUALLY HAS A CHARACTER.
RUN: 2.1MILES, 9.5MPH, 13MIN;
LEARN: TADELIS, 2HRS;
HLD: READ THE DRAFT, 3HRS;
HLD: CHAT WITH PL, PL DISAGREED ON ADDING KK, MAKE HIM CHANGE NEXT TIME, 7PM-10PM;
WORKLOAD: EMAIL T., IF NO RESPONSE BY TUESDAY, FILE IT YOURSELF;
SET FOR MOVIE ON SATURDAY
[KINGSTON, CANADA, SUMMER, 2006]
YOU MUST VIGOROUSLY PROTECT THE TIME FOR YOURSELF. FOR NOW, RESERVE THE AFTERNOON FOR PLAN AND ACTION. THE TIME YOU WILL DELIBERATELY NOT WORK. IF NOTHING ELSE, JUST READ. OTHERWISE, PLAN AND THINK ABOUT MY FUTURE.
THIS DELIBERATION AND ACTION TIME IS VITAL FOR YOUR GROWTH AND ULTIMATE HAPPINESS. YOU MUST PROTECT IT. DO SO FOR THE NEXT 3 WEEKS, UNTIL IT BECOMES A HABIT. THIS IS TIME FOR VISIONING, PLANNING, AND TAKING ACTIONS. FURTHER, THE MEASUREMENT OF DARING IS HOW MANY SETBACKS YOU HAVE: THE MORE YOU TRY, THE MORE SETBACKS YOU HAVE. THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE NO SETBACK IS NEVER TRY.
MOST OF THINGS ARE NOISE. ONLY A FEW ARE ESSENTIAL. YOU NEED TO FOCUS ON THOSE ESSENTIAL FEW. YOU NEED TIME TO PLAN AND EXECUTE YOUR VISION. THEREFORE, YOU MUST PUT UP THE BOUNDARIES FOR YOUR LIFE. FOR WORK, YOU HAVE BEEN THERE, DONE THAT. NOW IT’S TIME FOR YOUR LIFE.
[BANFF, CANADA, 10/2015]
It took me about a week. Finally I get the flow right.
We start the separating equilibrium part with the two necessary conditions. To characterize the equilibrium, we proceed in three steps. First, we specify the belief. This is an unusual treatment, but it is critical to simply the later exposition. Because R’s reactions— half of the story—depend on this belief.
The second step is to find the best retail and direct selling quantities. Here we use backward induction argument. We also lay out the optimization problem for each player.
The third step is to specify the equilibrium wholesale prices. The driving force here comes from the incentive compatibility constraints. Because type-L enjoys two advantages—the information advantage over R and the selling cost advantage over type-H—he has strong incentive to mislead. Therefore, for the equilibrium to be separating, type-L must prefer revealing than mimicking.
Got to finish the writing tomorrow.
[Jasper, Canada, 10/2015]
In the signaling game of education, the informed party, the worker, moves first. By taking costly actions, he tries to convince the firm of his true ability.
In contrast, the screening game arises when the uninformed party moves first. Before the worker acquires education, the firm can specify the wage rate for each education level. To ‘screen’, the wage is set so that only the high ability worker is willing to work for high education level. But that education level would be too costly/painful for the low ability worker to acquire—the wage cannot offset the cost of attaining high education level.
Technically, screening models are easier than signaling models to analyze. The main challenge for signaling games is the multiplicity of equilibrium, which diminishes the predictive power. The commonly used solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. One can also strengthen/refine it with further restrictions on the belief system. One such refinement is intuitive criterion.
[KELOWNA, CANADA, 9/2015]
RUN: 11MIN, 9MPH, 1.6MILES;
LEARN: LUENBERGER, 1HR;
CLEAN UP ELECTRONICS, 2HRS;
LEARN HOW TO USE ZIP BAGS TO ORGANIZE STUFF;