# WRITING 164: COMMITMENT, GAMES WE PLAY, 7

Yesterday we got R&R on BAR paper, a good news. But BE is unlikely to work on it. To motivate him,  I must draw the line, committing not to work it. Otherwise, BE will never work on it. Hopefully, the fear of letting me down can motivate him. If not, I will cut BAR as a sunk cost.

Either way,  I won’t waste time on BAR any more.

——————————————

Dear B,

This email is between you and me.

My gut feeling is that we hit the same guy as AE. The reports are written in the same style.

I believe DE liked the idea. Also, he has good impression of us, from our efforts in the last two rounds of the Markov chain paper.  But he cannot go against all the naysayers. So we must do more to prove our worth.

At this point, you and me have two papers at MS; they are promising but time consuming. The choice is clear: if you want it, you must put in effort, do what it takes, and go beyond what’s required.

I have time for only one such commitment. I will focus on the revision of the last paper (Markov chain). I will NOT spend time on this one: I believe in you and PA.

You have my word—I will deliver my revision in two months. And I expect the same commitment from your side.

Best,

ACTION415

# WRITING 163: GAMES WE PLAY, 6

You must set the boundary for your life. People are remarkably adaptive. If you don’t plan your life, others will.

Here is an example. I have the TYM project with a senior MG: the only thing he did was checking the grammars. Yet, because I willingly played the role of juniors, the normal game between seminar and junior workers, MG played his part to: they say they have great expectation of you. What they really mean is that  they will do almost nothing but want to slave you.

So I decided to reset the expectation by playing the game a bit differently. Here is the series of email exchanges in the last a few days.

———————————————

Hey, L – just checking in. Paper was to go out in Nov, Dec, Jan… Almost March!

We going to get it under submission?
M.G.

__________________________________

Dear M,

I have several pending revision going on. So I won’t be able to work on it for at least a month.

If you are in the hurry, here is the latest version that you can work on.

Best,

L.

——————————————————

I haven’t heard from him since. Expectation reset?

A side note. In signaling games, actions must be credible in order to signal (often go with costs others are unwilling to bear). The purpose is to change/sharpen the belief of the rival. Maybe this is the underlying logic for my action.

# WRITING 162: WORK PLAN FOR MARCH, MONTH 5, 262

MONTH 5, 262:

MORTALITY IS ENLIGHTENING. IT IS NOT DPRESSING, BUT THRILLING.

“IT INFUSES COURAGE INTO YOUR BONES.”

———————————–

HERE ARE A LIST OF THINGS YOU MUST ACT, IN YOUR OWN INTEREST.

FOR SCHOOL,

1) FOLLOW UP THE WORKLOAD POLICY ON MONDAY; IF NO, FILE THE CHARGE.

2) LIMIT YOUR AVAILABILITY FOR TWO DAYS PER WEEK. FOR THIS QUARTER, MONDAY AND FRIDAY. YOU ARE OFF FOR THE REST.

———————————–
FOR WORK,

YOU MUST LIVE UP TO YOUR TRUE POTENTIAL. TO DO SO, YOU MUST SET UP SHARP EDGED BOUNDARY. RESET OTHERS’ EXPECTATIONS. YOU NEED TIME FOR YOURSELF.

GET ALL THE TRIVIAL STUFF DONE. INVEST A WEEK FOR EACH. NO MORE. IF YOU CANNOT FINISH IT, CUT IT AND MOVE ON. AS THEY ARE SUNK COSTS, YOU CANNOT AFFORD WASTE MORE TIME ON THEM IN THE FUTURE.

1) TQ2: GET IT DONE IN A WEEK. SINCE YOU PROMISED KK, THIS ONE MUST COME OUT. DO WHAT YOU CAN. WRITE, WRITE, AND WRITE. DELIVER NEXT THURSDAY. NO MORE. 1 WEEK.

2) TYM2: PUSH BACK MG. BUT YOU OWES JS. SO SPEND A WEEK TO WRITE IT UP. 1 WEEK.

3) AO: LIMIT THE MEETING TIME TO 30MIN; WRAP UP AT 25MIN; ASK WHAT IS THE NEXT ACTION; ASK AO TO FOLLOW MY IDEA; GET IT MOVE; DON’T WASTE TIME ON THE TRIVIAL STUFF. ALSO, ASK HIM ABOUT IAD2—IN OR OUT. AGAIN, DON’T WASTE MY TIME. I HAD ENOUGH.

4) PLD: PUSH PL. EITHER SUBMIT OR ABANDON IT. DON’T WASTE MY TIME.

5) MHS: ASK M.E. TO WORK WITH J.S. IF M.E. WANTS IT, THEN DO THE WORK. I WILL NOT WASTE MORE TIME.

NOW EVERYTHING IS CLEAR. HERE IS MY WORK SCHEDULE FOR MARCH:
1) TQ2, 1 WEEK;
2) TYM2, 1 WEEK;
3) MRF: REVISION, FOR THE REST OF MARCH;
MAYBE: BAR, BUT ASK B.M. FIRST.

[WALL OF NINE DRAGONS, BEIJING,  CHINA, SUMMER, 2013]

# WRITING 161: LIVE MY LIFE

EVERYONE IS SELLING SOMETHING. THERE ARE TWO THINGS WE ALL SHARE: SECRETS AND DEATH. I KNOW YOUR SECRETS.

FROM NOW ON, I’LL LIVE MY LIFE, PLAY MY GAMES, AND FOCUS ON WHAT MATTERS TO ME. SAY NO TO THE REST.

CALL ME IRRESPONSIBLE. CALL ME ASSHOLE. CALL JERK. CALL ME WHATEVER. I WON’T FEEL GUILTY A BIT. I KNOW YOUR SECRETES. I WON’T CHANGE. I DON’T GIVE A FUCK WHAT YOU THINK.

AT THE END OF THE DAY, ALL THAT MATTERS IS MY LIFE. IT IS SUCH A LIBERATING AND EMPOWERING CONVICTION. IT GIVES CLARITY AND FOCUS.

# WRITING 160: PLAN THE CATALIA TRIP

Hi, C. and J.,

1. Time: For the trip, since C. returns on Friday, Sunday seems better.

We can meet around 8:15am at the Long Beach ferry port, and take the ferry (\$74) at 8:30am. The ride is about an hour. Then we can have breakfast/brunch on the island. We can return at either 3:45pm or 6pm.

http://www.catalinaexpress.com/images/pdf/schedules/Catalina_Express_Schedule_Winter2015.pdf

2. Things to do:  Zipline (\$109, 2hrs) and snorkeling (2hrs) are very popular. If snorkeling is too much trouble, we can try zipline. If that is also too much, we can always find other stuff to do.

http://www.visitcatalinaisland.com/specials-packages/activities/zip-ship

http://www.yelp.com/biz/catalina-zip-line-eco-tour-avalon

This paper studies a contract choice problem in the cross-sales setting. There are two competing manufacturers who sell substitutable products through two retailers to consumers. The demand is linear with uncertain intercept (potential). The retailers are better informed about the demand. There are two contract choices to organize the selling. The first is the wholesale price contract without information sharing, in which manufacturers decide based on the prior distribution of the demand, while each retailer $j$  use his more accurate demand signal $f_j$. The second contract choice is two-part tariff with information sharing, in which the manufacturers gain access to both signals $(f_1,f_2)$ for decision making. All parties are risk-neutral and profit-maximizing.